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A rugalmas korhatár bevezetése : egy dinamikus modell 
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A közgazdászok általában támogatják a rugalmas (változó) nyugdíjkorhatárt, de 
állandósult állapotot elemeznek. Ebben a dolgozatban a kötelező korhatárú 
nyugdíjrendszer helyett egy rugalmast vezetünk be, valós időben. Megmutatjuk, hogy 
még ha az előrehozott nyugdíjba vonulást kellően büntetjük, a tényleges nyugdíjkor 1 
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Abstract
Typically economists arguing for flexible (or variable) retirement age, but they rely on
steady state analysis. In this paper we consider the replacement of a mandatory retirement
system with a flexible one in real time. We show that even if early retirement is duly
punished, diminishing the effective retirement age by 1 year raises the first year’s and the
total expenditures during transition by 8% and 70% of the original annual expenditure,
respectively.
Keywords: retirement age, flexible retirement age, variable retirement age, transition
cost
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, in the developed countries, there has been a tendency to raise the full
benefit (normal, statutory etc.) retirement age (for short, FRA) in parallel with the rise
of life expectancy. This measure in itself is futile if the effective retirement age does not
increase similarly (from Gruber and Wise, eds. 1999 to Ch loń–Domińczak et al. 2021).
Considering new EU countries, Gál and Radó (2020, Figure 16.5) demonstrated that in
the foregoing countries, the two ages grew in parallel between 1996/2000 and 2014, easing
the public burden.
According to economic theory, the best method to achieve such a parallel increase
is to introduce an actuarially fair benefit–retirement age schedule: if a worker retires
one year earlier/later than normal, then her annual benefit is to decreased/increased so
that her lifetime net contribution remain 0. The simplest fair method is the so-called
Nonfinancial Defined Contribution (NDC, e.g. Sweden, see Appendix 3 to this paper),
but other methods work similarly well. These methods combine efficiency and fairness,
though self-criticism has recently emerged concerning the neglect of the strong positive
correlation between life expectancy and lifetime earnings (Breyer and Hupfeldt, 2009;
Holzmann et al., eds., 2020).
In contrast, several new EU countries have been applying rigid methods concerning
early retirement. In Czechia only those workers are allowed to retire before reaching FRA
who have at least 35 years of contributions and even they are severely punished (OECD,
2020, pp. 25-29 and Appendix 3 to this paper). In Slovakia, there is a condition for early
retirement: the initial benefit be at least as high as the minimum wage, approximately
equaling to the average pension benefit of the year. The Polish retirement age policy is
contrversial, for example, the effective retirement age frequently falls below the minimum
age (Ch loń–Domińczak, 2019 and Appendix 3 to the paper). Each system applies too
strict/loose requirements and diminishes social welfare with respect to a truly flexible
system.
Hungary has been operating a dual, loose/rigid system since 2011. First, every female
is allowed to retire without any benefit reduction if she acquired at least 40 years of
entitlement (correlated but not identical to years of contributions). Second, nobody else
is allowed to retire, even with reduced benefits, until she/he reaches the FRA, increasing
otherwise quite fast: 62 (2013), 63 (2016), 64 (2019) and 65 (2022). Such a system is
unfair to the excluded majority and socially suboptimal. Consider two females in 2021:
one is 64 years old and has 39 years of entitlement, she has to wait another six months to
retire. The other is only 60 years old but has 40 years of entitlement, therefore she can
retire without any other limitation and draw full benefits for another 5 years, when she
reaches her FRA (and after).
Why are such rigid/loose systems in force at all? Probably these governments do not
trust market incentives to keep average retirement age close to the FRA and they enjoy
making positive discrimination. But there are real problems with the flexible system as
well. We name four problems: (i) the bulk of the workers do not know the rules, and
eventually a large part may have opted for continued work if they knew the rules (Barr
and Diamond, 2008, Section 4.7; Benitez-Silva et al., 2009). (ii) Even if workers knew the
rules, they would retire at the earliest age (Barr, 2006). (iii) The healthier workers retire
later and live longer, therefore they gain, while others lose (Fabel, 1994; Diamond, 2003;
Eső and Simonovits, 2002; Simonovits, 2004; etc.). (iv) Replacing the rigid retirement
age, but fixing the contribution rate, temporary deficits arise. These factors frequently
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strengthen each other: for example, due to recent real wage explosion and wage indexation
of benefits in progress, in Hungary, early retirees lose with respect to workers delaying
their retirement but they cannot help, due to (i) and (ii) (Simonovits, 2019).
In this paper we shall confine our attention to issue (iv). Using very strong homo-
geneity assumptions on demography and economy, we show that if all workers retire at 64
rather than 65, then the temporary and the total costs of this reform are equal to 8 and
70% of the pre-reform one-year expenditure, respectively. (In the simplest static model,
the welfare gain is equal to 0.4%.) Relaxing our very strong assumptions the results would
change. We only modify one assumption: time-invariant real wage is replaced by time-
invariant real wage growth rate. The results are qualitatively valid but quantitatively
different: the discounted total costs in terms of annual expenditures drop from 0.7 to 0.49
as the annual growth rate rises from 0 to 4%. Of course, the costs of the reform can be
reduced by the elimination of Females40 but it is politically risky.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the Hungarian statistics on
the strange coexistence of rigid and loose systems. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the replace-
ment of the rigid system with a flexible one for time-invariant and growing average real
wages, respectively. Section 5 draws the conclusions. Appendices analyze complications
like 1) Females40, 2) the welfare impact of a flexible system and 3) the experiences in
Sweden, Czechia and Poland.
2 Rigid/loose retirement age in Hungary
In Hungary, between 2001 and 2007, the female FRA grew quite steeply, from 58 to 61
years but due to the weak incentives, the effective retirement age oscillated around 57.5
years. In 2009, FRA reached 62. while the effective retirement age jumped to 60 years.
Since 2011, there has been a radical change in pension policy: rigid and rising effective
retirement age with large exceptions in Females40, Table 1 presents the statistics of the
Hungarian old-age retirement system, 2011–2018. Notwithstanding the unification of male
and female FRAs, the practice of Females40 requires the separation of the two genders,
and within the females, favored and not-favored as well. As can bee seen, in each category,
the average retirement age has been increasing, the size of the retiring cohorts has been
oscillating. While in 2018, the FRA was already 63.5 years for those born in the second
half of 1955, and the average (i.e. effective) male retirement age slightly surpassed it,
the average Females40 retirement age was lower by 4 years and the total female average
stayed at 61.2 years.
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Table 1. Full and effective retirement ages and size of the retiring cohorts
















2011 62.0 57.6 54.8 58.5 84.9 60.3 43.2
2012 62.0 57.8 26.6 59.2 51.0 61.8 21.0
2013 62.0 58.0 24.0 59.6 40.0 62.2 21.6
2014 62.5 58.3 27.5 59.6 38.9 62.8 18.9
2015 62.5 58.7 28.6 60.0 41.6 62.7 22.2
2016 63.0 59.0 28.3 61.1 55.9 63.1 22.6
2017 63.5 59.3 28.7 61.0 46.9 63.6 32.3
2018 63.5 59.6 29.0 61.2 49.6 63.7 35.0
2019 64.0 59.6 27.6 62.0 59.6 64.1 57.0
Based on Fazekas et al. (2020), Table 11.5, p. 240.
3 Model with time-invariant real wage
In our models, we assume that there is no inflation, the population is stationary, the life
expectancy and the total fertility rate are time invariant, and each cohort is represented
by a single person. In the basic model, we also apply an additional assumption: the
(average) real wage is time-invariant. First we analyze a static (or steady state) model,
then we turn to the dynamic. To avoid complications, we assume that certain events
occur on December 31 of the corresponding year.
3.1 Static model
To prepare the ground, here we consider a static model (cf. Simonovits, 2003, Chapter
12). Our representative worker starts to work at age Q, works until age R, while earns
w (including all pension contributions), her contribution rate is equal to τ ∈ (0, 1) and
after retiring, she dies at age D: 0 < Q < R < D. Benefits in progress are equal to initial
benefits. For later use, we introduce the number of contributive years: S = R − Q and
the duration in retirement: T = D − R. The benefit is equal to the ratio of the lifetime




, S = R−Q, T = D −R. (1)
In this system, the lifetime net contribution z(R) is equal to 0. In fact, substituting b(R)
into
z(R) = τSw − b(R)T, (2)
a simple calculation yields z(R) = 0. This is true, regardless of the variance of wage w,
retirement age R and age at death D.
At the individual and governmental levels, however, the value of D is unknown, there-
fore we have to calculate with expected value in (1). From now on, we assume that Q
and D are identical but R can vary within a narrow interval Rm ≤ R ≤ RM.
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In the pension literature it is customary to relate benefits to net wages, called replace-
ment rate. As an illustration, we show how the benefit varies in the flexible system when
the retirement age varies as R = 60, . . . , 70, while Q = 25 and D = 81. Assuming a total
wage compensation w and a contribution rate τ = 0.2, hence a net wage u = (1−τ)w, it is
evident how low is the earliest net replacement rate and how high is the delayed one, both
with respect to the normal one. In addition, we present the accumulated proportional
modifications, which are strongly asymmetric.













R b(R)/u b(R)/b(65)−1 R b(R)/u b(R)/b(65)−1
60 0.417 –0.333 66 0.683 0.093
61 0.450 –0.280 67 0.750 0.220
62 0.487 –0.221 68 0.827 0.323
63 0.528 –0.156 69 0.917 0.467
64 0.574 –0.075 70 1.023 0.636
65 0.625 0
3.2 Dynamic model
We turn now to the simplest dynamic model. For the time being, we assume that each
cohort is represented by one person and they start and end working plus die at the same
age. The calendar years are denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. To simplify the calculations, we
need a complementary assumption: before the flexible system was introduced, the pension
system had operated with a mandatory retirement age R for T years, and the system was
in balance [(1)]:
Tb = τSw, b = b(R). (3)
(It would be more precise but too complicated to distinguish the rigid system’s parameters
as R∗ etc.)
The government introduces a limited flexible system in year t = 1: the minimal
retirement age is 1 year lower than FRA: Rm = R − 1. The new cohorts retire at the






What additional costs arise during the transition? For simplicity, we assume that the
contribution rate remains invariant, and the temporary deficit is financed by the budget.
We start with the determination of the first year’s cost, which is the sum of the missing
contribution of the early retirees and their added benefits, i.e. using (4)








where ρ = T/S denotes the old-age dependency ratio and Sτw is the original annual
pension contribution (and expenditure).
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We shall show that (Zt)
T+1
t=1 is a finite arithmetic series. Using the formulas for old
and new benefits (1) and (4), the change in the cost arising in year t is equal to





τw = − S + T





Then (6) and (5) yield





, t = 1, . . . , T + 1. (7)





Inserting (5) and (7) into (8), and applying the formula for the sum of the arithmetic
series:
C = τ












(S + T )w
2
. (9)





If ρ = 0.4, then by (5), the first year deficit is equal to (1 + 0.4)(1 + 16) = 8.2% of the
annual expenditure, while by (10), the total cost of transition is equal to (1+0.4)/2 = 0.7
of the original annual expenditure.
It is evident that the starting as well as the transitory costs are significant. They would
be even higher if we allowed for earlier retirement, 2 or 3 years below FRA and if the
workers chose them. Here we present a simple estimate for a 2-year reduction. Calculating
with double years, R′′ = 63, then S ′′ = 20 and T ′′ = 8, w′′ = 2w, i.e. C ′′ = 2C, the total
costs would be double of the 1-year reduction.
Of course, in reality, not everybody retires as soon as possible; there are even workers
who delay retirement beyond FRA. But to open the window of opportunity down is much
easier than to open it up. For example, if the widths of the window are equal to 3
years, then everybody can retire at 62. But those, who wanted to retire at 68 but were
forced to retire at 65, cannot return to work. The opening the window in both directions
requires time. It is conceivable that the opening should be step-wise: Rm(2023) = 64,
Rm(2024) = 63 and Rm(2025) = 62 years.
We note that it is possible to consider a contribution rate which balances the pension
system every year but it would complicate (1), namely in its numerator, τS would be
replaced by τt+1+· · ·+τt+S. We also neglected the variance of individual life expectancies.
Furthermore, workers die between minimum and maximum retirement ages, therefore the
expected remaining life expectancy DR − R is higher than our D − R, but we skip this
complication, too. Our model would be even more complex if we took into account the
fragmentation of the careers, the variances of earnings of the remaining life expectancies,
and of the cohort sizes. Here we would need serious empirical research. I can only cite
Péter Vékás’ information: in Hungary, the remaining life expectancy at 60 is about 20
years, and its standard deviation is almost 10 years.
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Due to historical reasons, in Hungary the accrual rate—which determines the benefit
as a function of the length of contributions—is increasing but its steepness hectically
depends on the very length. As a result, the aggregate accrual rates are equal to 53 vs.
27% for the first and the second 20 years, respectively. This anomaly is to be removed (as
was already planned for 2009) and regardless of the introduction of the flexible system, it
should be replaced by a constant rate. The delayed retirement credit and the deduction
rate for early retirement both might be equal to 6%/year, in addition to the marginal
accrual rate of 2%.
4 Model with increasing real wage
Relaxing our very strong assumptions the quantitative results would change. In this paper,
we only relax one assumption: time-invariant real wage is replaced by time-invariant real
wage growth rate. The results qualitatively remain valid. Reflecting the Hungarian
specifics, the cohorts’ benefits in progress remain age-invariant in real terms but the
initial benefits and the real wages increase with time. We shall see that our cost estimates
basically remain correct.
Again, we start the analysis with the quasi stationary version: Rt = R, and only after
finishing it we shall turn to the dynamic model: R′ = R− 1.
4.1 Quasi-stationary model
We shall need the real wage dynamic:
wt = w0g
t, (11)
where g stands for the real growth coefficient (=1+growth rate). We shall see (cf. Si-
monovits, 2020) that due to the economy of indexing to prices, the initial pension should
































Comparing (16) to (1), one can see that Tg stands for the “reduced duration in retirement”
due to price indexation. Question: how can the government guess the future real wage
growth rate ahead? Answer: the government can only forecast it and rely on buffer stocks
in corrections (cf. Sweden).
4.2 Dynamic model
Repeating the introduction of Subsection 3.2, we analyze the scenario of reducing the
retirement age while the real wages increase. We assume again that between years –15
and 0, a mandatory retirement age of 65 was operating, the real wages grew exponentially
and the benefits in progress kept their real values. What happens during the transition?
Generalizing the story of the previous Section, we still assume that the contribution rate
remains constant and the transitional deficit is financed by the government.
Again, from year t = 1, flexible retirement is introduced: Rm = R− 1. In an extreme
case, everybody retires at the minimum age: R′ = R−1. Then S ′ = S−1 and T ′ = T +1.








t−1, t = 1, . . . , T + 1. (4′)
It is worth directly calculating the first year’s deficit, which is the sum of the missing
contributions of the freed cohort and the newly awarded benefits:





To find the general solution, we need the time-varying average benefits (cf. (14)):
b̄t =
b1(1 + · · ·+ gt−1) + b0(1 + · · ·+ g−T+t)
T + 1
, t = 1, . . . , T
and b̄T+1 = τ(S − 1)w0gT+1/(T + 1).
The costs arising during the transition are given by the generalizations of the (6) and





Numerical example: It would be useless to the derive analytical formulae, therefore we
present the numerical paths of the initial benefits in terms of the total wage compensation
in year 0: w0 = 1, the annual and the accumulated costs, in terms of the original pension
expenditures B0. R = 65, R
′ = 64 year, N = 100 000 persons, g = 1.02. It can be seen
that due to rising real wages, the relative average pensions are rising, the relative annual
costs converge to zero and the accumulated costs converge to 66%, lower than in the static
case.
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t b̄t Zt/B0 Ct/B0
0 0.500 – –
1 0.503 0.074 0.074
2 0.510 0.070 0.143
3 0.518 0.066 0.209
4 0.526 0.062 0.271
5 0.534 0.057 0.328
6 0.542 0.053 0.381
7 0.550 0.049 0.430
8 0.558 0.044 0.474
9 0.567 0.040 0.514
10 0.576 0.035 0.549
11 0.585 0.030 0.580
12 0.594 0.026 0.605
13 0.603 0.021 0.626
14 0.613 0.016 0.642
15 0.622 0.011 0.652
16 0.632 0.005 0.658
17 0.642 0 0.658
To see the sensitivity of our calculations just to the growth rate of the real wages, Table
4 presents the initial average benefits and costs and the accumulated cost, each in terms of
the initial total wage for various rates. In addition to the undiscounted accumulated cost,







Calculating with an annual growth rate 4%, the initial benefit slightly grows, the initial,
the cumulated and the discounted costs are decreasing by 20, 12 and 30%, respectively.















g b̄1 Z1/B0 Ct/B0 C
g
t /B0
1.00 0.498 0.082 0.700 0.700
1.01 0.500 0.078 0.679 0.639
1.02 0.503 0.074 0.658 0.584
1.03 0.505 0.070 0.637 0.534
1.04 0.508 0.066 0.617 0.488
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5 Conclusions
In mature market economies, the flexible retirement harmonizes efficiency and fairness.
For example, in the US, Germany and Sweden, it functions without any special limitation.
The same system works in several ex-socialist economies, but with strong limits. For
example, in Czechia, one has to have to contribute at least 35 years to retire before
reaching FRA and the deduction is severe. These limitations seem to be excessive and
judged so by OECD (2020, p. 26). In Slovakia, the actuarially reduced initial benefit has
to reach the minimum wage, which is close to the average benefit. One Polish government
raised both FRAs then another renounced the long-term equalization of female and male
FRAs and reduced them to the original values.
In Hungary, the early retirement rules applied too low deductions before 2010. For
example, between 2003 and 2007, the female FRA rose from 59 to 61, but the effective
retirement age remained the same: cc. 57.5. Therefore it was correct to raise the deduc-
tions in 2010. Its elimination from 2012, however, was a clear mistake. After a decade
freeze, it is worth introducing an actuarially fair retirement system, but this involves non-
negligible temporary costs for two decades. The cost can be diminished by phasing out
the otherwise popular Females40, but it is quite demanding politically.
These strange combinations of loose and rigid retirement age policies are far from
being socially optimal but their replacement with a truly flexible system looks politically
difficult. In my opinion, all the four rigid systems should be replaced but its transitory
costs should be be taken into account.
In contrast to previous studies (e.g. Fabel, 1994; Diamond, 2003; Eső and Simonovits,
2002), now we do not study how the government chooses the pension rules and how
the workers react to them. Following others, the current paper neglects the impact of
indexation on retirement decision. Simonovits (2019) and (2020) suggest that with respect
to price indexation, the otherwise superior wage indexation weakens the incentives to delay
retirement. I only aimed to extend the static analysis to dynamic.
I tried to estimate these costs in a simplest model. Better models can involve more
realistic assumptions, extending its validity to other, partially flexible retirement systems
as well. The decision to introduce early retirement with actuarially fair deductions has
to be made by the corresponding governments.
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Eső, P. and Simonovits, A. (2002): Designing Optimal Benefits for Retirement, North
Western University, Discussion Papers 1353.
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Appendix 1. Estimation of the cost of Females40
We have already mentioned that Females40 is not only unfair but costly. Official data
of 2019 put its cost to 6% of the total pension expenditure. This number, however, is
debatable, because it mechanically calculates the total benefits paid to the beneficiaries of
the program. The true costs are different and this Appendix tries to estimate them. We
need the following notations: The program started in year U1 = 2011 and will terminate
in year U2 meaning that no new members are accepted. Lower index t refers to the year
of retirement. Not is the number of retirees in Females40, R
o
t is their average retirement
age, wt stands for the total wage compensation. We calculate with three types of costs
(i) missing contribution, (ii) the early benefits, and (iii) the excessive benefits paid after
the FRA. We assume that few Females40 retirees die before the closure of the program
and we do not model post closure events.
Ad (i) The missing contributions in year t. Roughly 4 years’ contribution is missing,
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those retiring within Females40 in years in t− 3, t− 2, t− 1, t:








t )wt, t = U1, . . . , U2.




U1−1 = 0, though there were other similar programs before 2011.
Ad (ii) The direct cost of early retirement in year t:








t bt, t = U1, . . . , U2.
Ad (iii) The additional benefits of Females40 (after R∗t )




t (∆bt), t = U1, . . . , U2,
with initial value V 3U1−1 = 0. On the one hand, the difference ∆bt between the unchanged
and the reduced benefit is a burden for life. On the other hand, the price indexation and
the recent real wage explosion reversed the process: a large part of the Females40 would
have gained if they had delayed their retirement, but they did not know about it and the
government failed to warn them.
Appendix 2. The welfare provided by flexible retire-
ment
In the main part of the paper we have avoided the use of utility functions, but to analyze
the welfare provided by flexible retirement we need utilities. In Appendix 2, constant real
wages are assumed. We choose the simplest utility function:
U [R] = (R−Q)[log((1− τ)w)− θ]− ϕ(R−Rm)+ + (D −R) log b(R), (A.1)
where parameters θ and ϕ represent the labor disutility of one year work during the whole
interval [Q,D] and the final interval [Rm, D], respectively; the subindex + refers to the
positive part of a real and b(R) is defined in (1). (Implicitly, we fixed the contribution rate
τ , because there is a wide-spread opinion that it should not be raised further.) Evidently,
the greater the θ and ϕ, the earlier the worker wants to retire. Since the numerical
value of the utility function has no direct economic meaning, we shall rely on the relative
efficiency, defined as follows. This is a real number ε, by which multiplying both the wage
and the benefit, the rigid system (R∗) provides the same utility as the flexible system (R)
without multiplication. (Here we follow the precise notation, which we mentioned below
(3), forsook until now.) In formula: using notation
U(R, ε) = (R−Q)[log((1− τ)wε)− θ]− ϕ(R−Rm)+ + (D −R) log(b(R)ε) (A.2)
the relative efficiency satisfies the following implicit equation:
U(R∗, ε) = U(R, 1). (A.3)
Using (A.2), a simple calculation yields
U(R, ε) = U(R, 1) + (D −Q) log ε,
i.e. (A.3) implies
U(R∗, 1) + (D −Q) log ε = U(R, 1).
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Hence the explicit formula for the relative efficiency is
ε = exp {[U(R, 1)− U(R∗, 1)]/(D −Q)}.
Adopting the numbers of Table 2, Table A1 shows the relative efficiency for ϕ = 0.1
with various θs. In column 3, θ = 2, characterizing those workers with high labor disutility,
who gain with early retirement. As can be seen, the optimal retirement age (italicized)
Ro = 63 raises utility by 0.4% above that of the rigid 65 year, but the real loss of utility
arises with higher age. In column 4, θ = 1.8 represents those workers, with medium
labor disutility for whom the optimal retirement age is just equal to the FRA. In column
5, θ = 1.5 stands for those workers, with low labor disutility, who gain with the delay:
Ro = 67 yields welfare 0.5% higher than the rigid 65, but the real loss of welfare arises
for forced early retirement.





Benefit/Wage high medium low
R b/w ε1 ε2 ε3
62 0.389 1.003 0.992 0.976
63 0.422 1.004 0.997 0.986
64 0.459 1.003 0.999 0.994
65 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000
66 0.547 0.995 0.998 1.004
67 0.600 0.987 0.995 1.005
68 0.662 0.978 0.988 1.004
Appendix 3. Retirement ages in Sweden, Czechia and Poland
In this Appendix we review the experiences with flexible retirement system in Sweden,
Czechia and Poland.
Palmer and Könberg (2020, pp. 30–32) described the Swedish system as satisfactory.
The starting point is the pioneer NDC, which almost directly implies flexibility. There
is no need for FRA but for limiting the use of supplementary pension, nobody can rely
on it below 65. There is an earliest retirement age: 61 years, below which only disability
pension is available. There is another, upper limit: 67 years, where the employer can
freely fire the worker. At the end of 2017, the six democratic parties agreed to raise the
retirement ages: to raise the minimal retirement age from 61 to 64 years between 2020 and
2026, in three steps; the threshold of supplementary benefit, 65 is raised to 66 years; and
the threshold of free firing from 67 to 69, both in two steps. The fast rise of the minimal
age, however, may represent dissatisfaction with the stagnating effective retirement age.
At the start of the reform (cc. 2000) 90% of the Swedes retired before or at 65 years;
this value was still 80% but the average remained at 65. The 1950-cohort’s 28% retired
before 65, 50% at age 65 and 22% after 65. In a certain degree, the choice of the retirement
age is rational. For example, workers with lower skill, whose life expectancies are lower,
retire as early as possible.
The following question arises: to what extent does the DC system influence the re-
tirement decision? As a background information, we note that between 1970 and 1990,
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the effective retirement age sank all over the world. The Swedish reform contributed to
the reversion of the process.
OECD (2020) critically analyzed the Czech pension system. Here we only confine our
attention to the timing of the retirement as a function of the length of contributions.
The Czech system is flexible but the conditions are very stringent: the worker has to
work at least 35 years claiming pension before reaching the FRA, and the reduction is
very severe (e.g. for retiring 5 years earlier, the reduction is 43% in contrast to –33.3%).
Figure 1.12 (OECD, 2020, p. 27) shows the distributions of retirees according to years of
contribution: Figure A for FRA, Figure B for early retirees. Note that both distributions
are concentrated at very high values!
Figure A. The distribution of new retirees with respect to years of contribution, FRA
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Figure B. The distribution of new retirees with respect to years of contribution, early
Turning to Poland, this country has had rather high male and female FRAs since 1954:
65 for males and 60 for females, respectively. The earliest retirement ages, however, were
5 years lower and the actual ones even lower. The relatively low life expectancies had
been stagnating until the 1990s. Due to the mass unemployment during the transition
period, effective retirement ages dropped before started increasing. As late as 2012, male
effective retirement age was as low as 59.7 years, and in 2007 the female counterpart 53.8
years. Since then, both effective retirement ages have been increasing, to 64.6 and 61.0,
respectively, stabilizing the retirement duration.

























Source: Ch loń-Domińczak (2019, Figure 2).
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